

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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O P 041625Z APR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7015  
INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 2482

EXDIS

NOFORN

VIENNA FOR LEDSKY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR, TU, CY, GR  
SUBJ: CYPRUS: RESTRAINTS ON TURKISH POLICY

1. I MET TODAY WITH A SENIOR, AND FULLY-INFORMED, TURKISH MFA OFFICIAL WHO ASKED THAT I COME TO HIS OFFICE ALONE FOR WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS AN "ESTRORDINARILY FRANK" UNOFFICIAL TALKS. HE ASKED THAT I NOT REVEAL HIS NAME IN REPORTING THIS CONVERSATION-IN FACT, TWICE DURING THE CONVERSATION HE ASKED THAT I NOR REPOT IT AT ALL. (HE KNOWS, HOEVER, THAT I AM DOING SO). THERE ERE NO NOTETAKERS PRESENT, BUT MY INTERLOCUTOR WAS ACCCOMPANIED BY ANOTHER MFA OFFICIAL WITH WHO HE HAS WORKED CLOSELY ON CYPRUS MATTERS.

2. HE BEGAN BY INDICATING THAT WHAT HE HAD TO SAY NOT ONLY REFLECTED HIS OWN VIEWS BUT ALSO FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL'S, AND THAT THE LATTER KNEW ABOUT THE CONFIDENTIAL

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CONVERSATION HE WAS ABOUT TO HAVE WITH ME. HE THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:  
A. THE U.S. CONGRESSIONAL EMBARGO HAD PLACED THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION AS FAR AS MOVING FORWARD WITH ANY INITIATIVES FOR A CYPRUS SOLUTION. POLITICAL LEADER, AND SPECIFICALLY PRIMIN DEMIREL, HAD BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE

DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF DOING SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE WITH REGARD TO A CYPRUS SOLUTION " UNDER DURESS." BUT IN TIME THERE HAD BEEN SOME CONGRESIONAL AMELIORATION OF THE INTIAL EMBARGO, AND THIS HAD LED TO A WOMEWHAT IMPROVED ATOMOSPHERE IN WHICH THE PRIMIN COULD WORK. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRIMIN HAS ALWAYS BEEN CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND IT WAS HIS VIEW THAT THE DENKTASH/MAKARIOS TALKS OPENED UP AN OPPROTUNITY FOR TURKEY TO DO SOMETHING. THE PRIMIN REGARDED IT AS "AN HISTORIC OCCASION, WHICH SHOULD NOT BE LOST." AS A RESULT, BOTH THE PRIMIN AND THE FONMIN HAS SINCE THAT TIME MADE A STRENUOUS EFFORT TO MOVE THE SITUATION FORWARD. PRESIDENT KORUTURK AND CHIEF OF THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF (TGS), GENERAL SANCAR, WERE " CAREFULLY CONSULTED AND DULY PREPARED", THE BASIC PROPOSITION BEING THAT SOME MOVEMENT SHOULD BE MADE TOWARD A CYPRUS SOLUTION BECAUSE, DESPITE GOT OBJECTIONS TO "LINKAGE", THIS WAS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO TURKEY. BOTH AGREED WITH PRIMIN, FONMIN AND SENIOR MFA CAREERISTS THAT IT WOULD BE HARMFUL TO TURKEY'S LARGER SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS IF THE SITUATION WERE ALLOWED TO DRAG ON, AND THAT IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HARMFUL TO TURKEY IF THE IMPRESSION WERE GIVEN ABROAD THAT IT WAS FOORT-DRAGGING.

B. UNFORTUNATELY, STRENUOUS EFFORTS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) DID NOT PRODUCE THE RESULT WHICH WAS SOUGHTU. THE ERBAKAN GROUP, IN AN "OBSTINATE" AND "OPINONATED" WAY, STRONGLY AND SUCCESSFULLY OPPOSED EVERYTHING" WE ARE TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH." THE GREEK SIDE

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DIDN'T HELP BY LEAKING THE MAP AND BY LATER MAKING UNREASONABLE DEMANDS FOR AN INSTANT TURKISH REACTION. BUT THE REAL PROBLEM WAS DENKTASH'S UNWILLINGESS TO TAKE ANY POSITION REGARDING TERRITORY WITHOUT THE CLEAR AND OFFICIAL SUPPORT OF THE GOT- AND THE LATTER WAS NOT OBTAINABLE IN THE PRESENT PRE-ELECTION CIRCUMSTANCES BECAUSE OF THE ERBAKAN FACTIN'S SUCCESSFUL BLOCKING TACTICS IN THE NSC.

C. WHAT IS NEEDED, NOW, IT TIME. BETWEEN NOW AND THE ELECTION-AND ESPECIALLY IF THE ELECTION IS IN JUNE (AN EXPECTIATION BUT NOT YET A CERTAINTY)- THERE IS SIMPLY NOTHING THE GOT CAN DO BEYOND THE POSITION IT IS PRESENTLY TAKING IN VIENNA. DENKTASH HAS TOLD ANKARA THAT THE GREEK PROPOSAL ON TERRITORY IS SO BAD THAT IT SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE DISCUSSED; IT SHOULD BE REJECTED OUT OF HAND. HE HAS ALSO SAID THAT THE ONLY SOULUTION NOW IS A UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (UDI) FOR THE TURKISH REGION. NEVERTHELESS, THE GOT WILL NOT PERMIT

THE GREEK PROPOSAL TO BE REJECTED AT THIS TIME, AND IS  
INSISTING THAT IT BE DISCUSSED. NOR WILL THE GOT  
PERMIT UDI UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, AND AS LONG AS  
THE TURKISH ARMY IS ON CYPRUS, THE MAINLAND TURKS  
WILL HAVE THE FINAL SAY ON THAT. BUT WHAT TURKEY  
CANNOT REPEAT NOT DO, DESPITE THE HIGH HOPES RECENTLY  
ENTERTAINED BY A NUMBER OF ITS KEY OFFICIALS (INCLUDING  
MY INTERLOCUTOR), IS MAKE TERRITORIAL COUNTER PROPOSALS  
OR IN EFFECT "ENGAGE IN SUSTAINED NEGOTIATIONS"  
IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND THE TURKISH ELECTIONS.

D. USG HELP IS NEEDED IN PREVENTING THE GREEK SIDE FROM EXPLOIT-  
ING THE SITUATION. "THERE MUST NOT REPEAT NOT BE A RUPTURE  
IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING EFFORT", HE EMPHASIZED.

DESPITE THE DISCOURAGING NATURE OF THE  
IMMEDIATE SITUATION, THE PROSPECTS IN THE LONGER TERM  
FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE TURKISH ROLE AND A RATIONAL SOLUTION  
TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM ARE GREATLY ENHANCED AS A RESULT  
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OF WHAT HAS BEEN RECENTLY TRANSPIRING IN ANKARA. HE  
THEN ASKED THAT WHAT HE WAS ABOUT TO TELL ME BE CLOSELY  
HELD WITHIN THE USG (AND THAT NONE OF HIS COMMENTS BE  
REPEATED TO UN OR THIRD-COUNTRY OFFICIALS). HE  
PARTICULARLY ASKED THAT HIS NAME NEVER BE TIED TO THE  
COMMENTS HE WAS ABOUT TO MAKE ON TERRITORY. "IF THAT  
EVER HAPPENS, I WILL HAVE TO DENY THAT I EVER  
SAID THESE THINGS TO YOU", HE SAID.

E. BEFORE GETTING TO TERRITORY, HE FIRST SAID  
THAT, AS HE WASURE THE USG SURMISED, THE TURKISH  
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSAL WAS "JUST THE BEGINNING" AND  
THE TURKS ARE FULLY PREPARED, AS THE NEGOTIATIONS  
PROGRESS, TO MAKE "FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS" WITH RESPECT  
TO IT. THIS CANNOT REPEAT NOT BE DONE BETWEEN NOW AND  
THE ECLECTIONS, HOWEVER.

F. ONCE THE ELECTIONS ARE OVER, THE TURKS WILL  
ALSO BE IN A POSITION TO DO SOMETHING SIGNIFICANT ON  
TERRITORY. HERE HE WAS OPERATING NOT JUST ON HOPE,  
BUT ON SOLIS EVIDENCE. THE EVIDENCE HE CITED  
HAD COME FROM RECENT NSC MEETINGS AT WHICH HE HAD BEEN  
PRESENT. THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF HAD BRIEFED THE NSC ON THE AREAS  
WHICH THE TURKS "COULD DO WITHOUT." THESE AREAS WERE  
"VERY SUBSTANTIAL." WHEN I ASKED WHAT HE MEANT BY

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ACTION SS-25

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AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 02482

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SUBSTANTIAL, HE REPLIED THAT THEY EMBRACED THE FOLLOWING: VAROSHA; KOKKINA; AREAS BETWEEN FAMAGUSTA AND THE ERCAN AIRPORT; AND AREAS BETWEEN NICOSIA AND LEFKÉ. THESE PROPOSALS WERE ACCEPTED IN THE NSC NOT ONLY BY THE MILITARY BUT BY ALL THE COALITION PARTNERS EXCEPT ERBAKAN AND HIS NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY (NSP). MY MFA COLLEAGUE ALSO EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE (A CONFIDENCE I DO NOT REPEAT NOT FULLY SHARE) THAT, GIVEN THE MILITARY'S POSITION, IT WOULD NOT BE TOO DIFFICULT FOR ECEVİT'S REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY TO ACCEPT A COMPARABLE TERRITORIAL STANCE.

G. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERIES, MY COLLEAGUE DECLINED TO BE MORE SPECIFIC, SAYING THAT HE ALREADY JEOPARDIZED HIS CAREER BY TELLING ME THIS MUCH. THIS WAS NOT INCLUDED IN WHAT CAGLAYANGİL HAD EXPECTED HIM TO TELL ME, AND HE REPEATED THAT IF THESE COMMENTS WERE EVER TIED TO HIS NAME, HE WOULD HAVE TO DENY THEM. HE

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HAD MADE THEM, HOWEVER, SO THAT I WOULD NOT THINK HIS TALK ABOUT REAL PROGRESS AFTER THE ELECTION WAS JUST TALK. IF AN ELECTION RESULT COULD BE OBTAINED WHICH PERMITTED THE FORMULATION OF A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT ERBAKAN, SERIOUS AND BONA FIDE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN ABOUT THREE MONTHS THEREAFTER, AND HE THOUGHT A SOLUTION COULD BE OBTAINED RELATIVELY SOON AFTER THAT. IT WAS

PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT, THEREFORE, TO HAVE USG HELP IN AVOIDING, IN THE MEANTIME, A BREAK IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE MEETINGS COULD BE SLOWED AS TO PACE BUT THEY SHOULD BE KEPT GOING FOR A MUTUAL PROBING EXERCISE AND FOR CLEARING AWAY FACTUAL QUESTIONS IN PREPARATION FOR THE POST-ELECTION DISCUSSIONS.

3. I EXPRESSED DISCOURAGEMENT OVER WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME. I NOTED THAT THE GOT HAD COMMITTED ITSELF TO "SUSTAINED" NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT WHAT HE WAS NOW TELLING ME FELL FAR SHORT OF MEETING THAT COMMITMENT. HE RECOGNIZED THIS, HE SAID, AND ADDED THAT IT WAS THEREFORE PERHAPS NOT WISE OF HIM TO BE SO FRANK WITH ME. AL

L HE COULD SAY WAS THAT A MAJOR BONA FIDE EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE WITHIN THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO LIVE UP TO ITS CLIFFORD COMMITMENTS. AT ONE POINT IN THIS EFFORT HE HIMSELF HAD FELT GREAT OPTIMISM, GIVEN THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE EFFORT, BUT IN THE END IT HAD FAILED. IF THE GOT'S FAILURE IN THIS REGARD IS NOW EXPLOITED BY THE GREEKS, SO AS TO BRING ABOUT A BREAK IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE OPTION OF A RESTORED US/TURKISH SECURITY PARTNERSHIP COULD BE LOST TO BOTH TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES.

4. I COUNTERED BY SAYING THAT WHAT PARTICULARLY DIS-COURAGED ME WAS THAT THE GOT APPEARED NOW TO HAVE QUIT IN THE EFFORT TO MEET ITS COMMITMENTS TO SECRETARY CLIFFORD. NO ONE IN THE USG WOULD BE SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT

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INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES HAD BEEN ENCOUNTERED, BUT THIS WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM GIVING UP - AS HE WAS NOW UNOFFICIALLY, BUT UNEQUIVOCALLY, TELLING ME THAT THE GOT WAS DOING UNTIL THE ELECTIONS WERE OVER. MY INTERLOCUTOR SAID THAT THE FONMIN STILL TALKED ABOUT TRYING TO DO SOMETHING BUT IN FACT THERE WAS NOTING MORE TO BE DONE. THERE IS A POWER VACUUM HERE, HE SAID, WHICH PREVENTS DEALING WITH ANY IMPORTANT PROBLEMS. IN ADDITION THE GOT WAS VERY MUCH DISADVANTAGED BY THE USG'S TACTIC OF DELAYING ACTION ON THE DCA. THE KEY MOMENT IN THE NSC DEBATE HAD COME WHEN ERBAKAN AND HIS FOLLOWERS CHALLENGED THE PRIMIN; "EVEN IF WE DO WHAT YOU ARE ASKING, CAN YOU GIVE US ASSURANCE THAT THE US WILL THEN MOVE THE DCA?" THE PRIMIN COULD NOT GIVE THIS ASSURANCE. "THAT IS WHAT FINALLY DEFEATED US, "MY COLLEAGUE SAID. TO GIVE AN INDICATION OF THE BITTERNESS OF THE MEETING, HE ADDED THAT "ONE OF ERBAKAN'S GANG," MINISTER OF INTERIOR ASILTURK, HAD EVEN THREATENED GENERAL SANCAR, TGS CHAIRMAN. ASILTURK DID THIS BY

SAYING THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A GOOD THING IF THE TURKISH PUBLIC SHOULD LEARN THAT GENERAL SANCAR WAS MAKING SUCH A GENEROUS OFFER TO THE US AND THE GREEKS.

5. I WAS SURE, I SAID, THAT THE US WOULD WISH TO DO ALL IT COULD TO PREVENT THE TALKS FROM RUPTURING, BUT WHAT COULD I TELL WASHINGTON THE TURKS WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO? THE REPLY WAS THAT THE TURKS CAN DO NOTHING MORE THAN THEY HAVE DONE. I THEN READ POINTS A, B, C AND D, PARA 1, IN STATE 73272, AND SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE TURKS AT A MINIMUM MEET POINTS C AND D (NEITHER SIDE TO DISMISS OTHER'S PROPOSAL, AND EACH SHOULD GIVE DETAILED COMMENTS REGARDING THEIR PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSALS BEFORE THEM). "THAT IS WHAT WE HAVE DONE," NO COLLEAGUE ASSERTED, TO WHICH I RESPONDED, "KEEP DOING IT."

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6. OUR CONVERSATION THEN CONCLUDED WITH THE MFA OFFICIAL'S REITERATING THAT WHILE PROSPECTS WERE DISCOURAGING IN THE SHORT RUN, HE FELT THAT THEY WERE CONSIDERABLY BETTER IN THE LONGER TERM AS A RESULT OF THE POSITION THAT ALL BUT THE ERBAKAN ELEMENT HAD NOW TAKEN. HE WAS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT THESE LONGER TERM PROSPECTS COULD BE DAMAGED IF THE DCA AND THE US/TURKISH RELATIONSHIPS BECAME EMBROILED IN THE FORTHCOMING CAMPAIGN. THE DANGERS OF THIS MIGHT BE LESSENED CONSIDERABLY IF THERE WERE ANY PROSPECT OF THE USG'S BEGINNING ACTIVELY TO SEEK THE DCA'S PASSAGE THROUGH THE CONGRESS, HE SAID, AND HE ASKED WHETHER I THOUGHT THERE WAS ANY IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF THIS. I SAID WASHINGTON MIGHT POSSIBLY ENDORSE THE DCA AT SOME POINT FAIRLY EARLY ON, BUT I KNEW OF NO PRESENT PLANS FOR SCHEDULING EARLY CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION.

7. MY COLLEAGUE'S FINAL COMMENT WAS REVEALING. HE SAID THAT TURKEY'S PRESENT POLICY WAS BEING CONTROLLED BY "FANATICS" (THE ERBAKAN GROUP) WHO LIVE IN A "DREAM WORLD." WHATEVER THEY SAY, THEIR REAL OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO PREVENT GIVING UP TERRITORY ON CYPRUS. THEY DON'T REALLY CARE ABOUT THAT. WHAT THEY WANT TO DO IS FORCE A BREAK BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE WEST - PARTICULARLY WITH THE UNITED STATES -- SO THAT THEY CAN TURN BACK TO THE WORLD OF ISLAM WHICH IS WAITING FOR TURKISH LEADERSHIP. THEY REALLY BELIEVE THIS "FANTASY," MY COLLEAGUE SAID. AS FOR PRESIDENT KORUTURK AND GENERAL SANCAR, THEY ARE BOTH ANGRY AND FRUSTRATED OVER THE PRESENT SITUATION. DISGUSTED AS THEY ARE BY THE USG'S JEOPARDIZING THE TURKISH FLANK

OF NATO OVER WHAT THEY REGARD AS THE FAR LESS IMPORTANT MATTER OF CYPRUS, THEY ALSO FEEL THAT TURKEY HAS GOTTEN ITSELF INTO AN "ABSURD" (PRESIDENT KORUTURK'S WORD) SITUATION IN ALSO ALLOWING THIS FAR LESSER MATTER TO JEOPARDIZE TURKEY'S BASIC SECURITY INTERESTS.

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## Message Attributes

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